Abstract

This chapter describes the institutions of legislative debate in the Mexican *Cámara de Diputados* and assesses predictors of floor participation. Multiple regression models are fit on more than 23,000 speeches between 2006 and 2020. They show that majority party members get privileged floor access, in both the number of speeches delivered and their word length, even after accounting for there being more potential speakers in larger parties. Other status indicators, such as committee chairs, party leaders, and seniority, have more modest but also positive effects in debate. Women speak more than men. And the removal of single-term limits in 2018, which tend to personalize elections, associate with a significant surge in floor participation.

Keywords

floor debate; speech; Congress; presidential democracy; Mexico

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**Mexico**

Parties and Floor Access in the *Cámara de Diputados*

*Eric Magar*

In the end, the chamber is a mandarinate

where the few decide for all. This doesn’t

mean that independent voices cannot

speak … knowing the Rules goes a long

way. You can take the rostrum by just

raising your hand for fact checking, or by

making suspensive motions, or by

reserving articles from the report

(Former deputy from the Left,

interviewed on condition of anonyymity, June 17, 2020)

**Introduction**

Legislative studies are a relatively young field of Mexican politics. Its growth is remarkable, with new research on candidate selection (Ascencio and Kerevel [2021](#B1)); elections and redistricting (Magar et al. [2017](#B28)); the standing committee system (Béjar Algazi [2009](#B3)); party discipline (Téllez del Río [2018](#B42)); vote trading (López Lara 2013); pork-barreling (Kerevell [2015](#B23)); procedure and instability (Heller and Weldon [2003](#B21)); gubernatorial influences in roll-call voting (Rosas and Langston [2011](#B39)); constitutional amendment (Casar and Marván Laborde [2014](#B9)); executive success (Béjar Algazi [2012](#B2)) and conditions for predominance (Weldon [1997](#B44)); agenda setting (Casar [2016](#B8)); the budget process (Weldon [2002](#B46)), and more.

Yet there is no scholarship on legislative debate in sight. Other than brief and general mentions to the subject, I could find no systematic study of floor access. This chapter takes a step towards filling in this gap by describing the institutions of speech in the *Cámara de Diputados* and performing a systematic examination of the determinants of floor participation.

The case should raise interest beyond area specialists. Mexico has a separation-of-powers constitution that has experienced divided and unified government in recent years. The three-and-a-half party system is distinct from both North American dualism and systems with extreme fragmentation, such as Brazil. And Mexico recently dropped single-term limits for members of Congress. Proksch and Slapin ([2015](#B35)) theorize that personal vote incentives make legislators organize the assembly with high levels of autonomy in floor debate. With little intra-party competition, such incentives were mostly absent in Mexico, but are bound to increase due to electoral reform.

The chapter uncovers a tension between formal and informal speech institutions. Formal rules decentralize agenda power by granting members broad rights of recognition to take the floor and deliver speeches. Informal rules channel debate through legislative parties, leaders managing participation in a centralized fashion. The empirical analysis reveals systematic effects of predictors associated with party hierarchies (such as leaders, committee chairs, and majority status) and predictors tied to individual candidate promotion (such as incumbents elected in single-member districts and the prospect of reelection) in the number and length of the speeches that members of Congress deliver. Focus is on the *Cámara de Diputados* of the bicameral Congress. The chambers have symmetric powers over most legislation, but the Senate is excluded from adoption of the annual budget, and I leave it out. Moreover, due to time constraints, I further narrow the focus to three out of eight Cámara terms since the advent of competitive politics in Mexico. I examine the 60th Legislature (2006–2009), the 62nd (2012–2015), and the 64th (2018–2021) up to the end of the second ordinary year—enough to investigate how the recent removal of term limits affects debate.

**Institutional and Party System Background**

Mexico is a presidential democracy. For most of the twentieth century a hegemonic party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), held the strings of political influence in a tight grip nationwide. The PRI’s electoral fortunes suffered from societal change and formidable economic setbacks in the 1980s, but it was not until 1997 that competitive politics took over (Cornelius [1996](#B10); Cosío Villegas 1981; Molinar [1991](#B29); Scott [1959](#B41)). For the first time in over six decades, the PRI lost control of the lower chamber of Congress in that year’s midterm election. Then in 2000 the country’s long-standing right-of-center opposition, the National Action Party (PAN) won the presidential race.

Along with democracy came two decades of divided government. The executive’s control of the legislative process ended abruptly, inaugurating relative balance between the branches (Lujambio [1995](#B26); Weldon [1997](#B44)). The president retained a prominent role in lawmaking, but genuine negotiation with the opposition was required to get things done (Béjar Algazi [2012](#B2)).

The party system of the competitive era had three major and a handful of small opportunistic parties. Majors included the PAN, the PRI, and a left-of-center Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Local competition was generally between the PRI and another major. The PRI retained strongholds from its hegemonic era in towns and smaller cities, but neither party had particularly strong ties to social groups (Moreno [2009](#B30)). Parties would rebuild clientelistic coalitions from near scratch at every electoral campaign (Díaz Cayeros et al. [2016](#B17)).

The three-plus party system came crashing down in the critical election of 2018. After decades of infighting the left split. The faction loyal to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known as AMLO, successfully launched the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), a new party, overcoming redoubtable entry barriers. This feat paved his way to victory in the presidential race by a landslide. Riding AMLO’s coattails, Morena won a majority in Congress—51 percent of Cámara seats. A constant feature of the party system that inaugurated the competitive era was that major parties jointly commanded about 85 percent of deputies, like they did in the 60th and 62nd terms. Majors lost two-thirds of their joint size in the formidable Morena swing. Inclusion of the incomplete 64th Legislature (data runs up to June 30, 2020 which marks the end of the second year) brings the single-party unified government to contrast with the other terms: a minority president in the 60th and an informal coalition with opportunistic parties in the 62nd.

Weak parties in the electorate lie in sharp contrast to strong legislative parties, which they draw from electoral rules. The formula is mixed-member plurality—300 deputies are elected every three years by first-past-the-post in single member districts (SMDs), 200 more by closed-list proportional representation (PR), all seats contested in races concurrent with the presidential election, then again at the presidential midterm (Weldon [2001](#B45)).

What gave leaders their centrality were two other key features. Single-term limits, which the constitution set on every elected officeholder, diverted all political ambition to the progressive format (Schlesinger [1966](#B40)). And centralized ballot access gives national and state party leaders control of future political careers (Langston [2008](#B24)).[[1]](#footnote-1)

Leaders control a stock of selective incentives to reward loyalty. Leaders distribute their party’s share of committee chairs and seats. The Junta appoints members at the start of the term, and freely makes replacements afterwards by simple announcement to the floor. This is a key selective incentive to achieve collective action in the partisan theory of congressional organization (Cox and McCubbins [1993](#B14)). Leaders have other carrots and sticks in the form of discretionary spending. By one count, leaders of the 60th Legislature (2006–2009, included in the data) routinely received discretionary spending authority over one-fifth of the Cámara’s yearly budget—plane tickets, bonus payments, and income tax breaks that could be handed to the rank and file (Casar [2011](#B7)).

This institutional combination both removes personal vote incentives (Cain et al. [1987](#B4); Carey and Shugart [1995](#B6)) and rewards top-bottom discipline. An indicator is cohesion, which is near perfect across parties. Téllez del Río ([2018](#B42)) computed frequencies with which deputies voted against a majority of their party. Excluding unanimous votes, the mean for the 1997–2018 period is just 2 percent, or 3.4 percent when abstentions are counted as votes against the party majority (p. 25).

Discipline plays a fundamental role in floor access. Formal rules, we see next, make it very difficult to control the flow of legislation without legislative parties. Party discipline operates as an alternative to agenda cartelization in many systems (Prata [2001](#B34)), including the Cámara.

In a surprising recent development, single-term limits were eliminated for selected offices, including federal deputies. The 2021 midterm election will be the first since the 1930s where incumbents are allowed on the ballot (see Magar [2017](#B27) for details). This should introduce a degree of personal vote seeking among a subset of deputies with static ambition. While reformers further centralized nominations by keeping term limits in place for party switchers, this might not fully reign in competitive incumbents. Parties removing quality candidates—such as previous winners of elected office (Jacobson [1997](#B22)), dynastic candidates (Enríquez González 2018), and what Zaller ([1998](#B47)) calls “prize fighters”—in order to secure nomination of docile newbies, risk losing those districts.[[2]](#footnote-2) I examine the effect of letting static ambition play out on debate in the partial 64th term.

**The Institutional Setting of Legislative Debate**

A prominent study of agenda setting in Mexico aims the focus on the executive in the legislative arena, and only secondarily on intra-cameral institutions. Casar ([2016](#B8)) characterizes debate in Congress as centralized: “[governing] bodies have the power … to conduct floor debates, including assigning turns and time to speakers” (p. 154). The overview of the structure of legislative debate in this section shows that this view has de facto practice in mind, because formal rules actually decentralize agenda power to a considerable extent.

The Cámara’s Rules (Reglamento [2019](#B37)) has prescriptions for debate, the Organic Law (Orgánica [2019](#B31)) for congressional organization. There are two assembly governing bodies, the Junta and the Mesa. The *Junta de Coordinación Política* is the Cámara’s top decision-making organ. The leaders of all parties with no fewer than five deputies are represented. The majority leader presides the Junta throughout the term. In the absence of a majority party, however, the leaders of the top-three seat holding parties preside the Junta, alternating one year each. The Junta appoints and replaces committee members, prepares each session’s order of the day (*orden del día*), and in general makes and enforces party agreements. It decides by majority rule, with members’ votes weighted relative to group sizes in the plenary. The majority can control the Junta (cf. Cox and McCubbins [2005](#B15)).

The *Mesa Directiva* is the chamber’s steering board. The Mesa chair is the Cámara president *ex-officio*. The Mesa makeup has consensual traits even when a party has the majority. The Mesa is elected yearly by two-thirds supermajority of Cámara members from Junta-proposed candidates. While Mesa members can re-elect, the chair must rotate between the top three seat-holding parties, one year each.

Agenda control is somewhat decentralized. First, every committee report is guaranteed floor consideration and must be included in the order. Committees have ability to withhold bill reports, granting them a veto over proposals in their jurisdiction. A two-thirds vote in the floor over-rides the veto. If committees were adequate agents of the Junta majority (cf. Cox and McCubbins [1993](#B14)), they might prevent consideration of unwanted bills. But the Junta is required to distribute relatively powerful committee chairs proportionally among the parties—chairs distribute the committee’s staff and spending with great discretion (Casar [2011](#B7)). And no party can control more than half of committee members, forcing vote-buying or plain cooperation across the aisles. Therefore, some committees are bound to be preference outliers.

Second, the default method for bill consideration in the floor has unrestricted introduction of amendments to the bill reported. Debate takes place in two stages. The entire bill is first examined *en lo general*, then articles are considered individually *en lo particular* (see Heller and Weldon [2003](#B21)). Members can freely reserve articles for deletion, amendment, or expansion, denying the Junta a useful procedural tool common in other assemblies: the take-it-or-leave-it rule (e.g., Cox [2006](#B13); Dion and Huber [1996](#B18)).

Third, and most relevant to this chapter, speakers self-select. Individual members are entitled to take the floor when recognized by the presiding officer, for a duration set by rules or by ad hoc party agreements. And recognition is permissive. Introducing amendments to a report, for instance, grants right of recognition to take the floor. True, party leaders assign speakers for the first round of debate slots. But they cannot formally preclude others from adding their names to the list of speakers afterwards, making debate resemble first-come-first-served after the party appointees have spoken. The limit is the floor, who can decide to vote the motion or to continue debating.

Rules typify limits for different kinds of debate summarized in Table [28.1](#Tab1). The first entry are drafters of new legislation, who get first recognition to take the floor in order to persuade fellow lawmakers. The time limit is ten minutes when the draft is a new law, five minutes when it changes existing statutes. Bills whose author has not had a chance to present before the session ends migrate to the next day’s order upon author’s request viva voce (otherwise they are referred to committee.) The rightmost columns report who selects the speaker—self-selection by drafting a bill, in this case—and who, if anyone, can veto the speaker’s recognition—no one here.

Other speech types grant right of first recognition differently. Debate *en lo general* grants ten minutes (fifteen in constitutional amendments) to the reporting committee chairperson or designated handler of the report. The only check is not too robust: the Cámara president can delay this intervention by recommitting the bill—and possibly prevent it if the committee kills the bill. *En lo particular* amendments and Cámara resolutions grant first recognition to the proposing member.

<COMP: INSERT TABLE 28.1 NEAR HERE>

Party-selected speakers get five minutes each, in reverse-size order, right after the chair’s speech. Persuading to vote against *en lo general* kills the bill. Members who request it then get five minutes each, the president arranging them in rounds, one for one against. After six such rounds, a previous question motion is made: the floor can either proceed to vote, or continue with blocks of three such rounds if the majority allows it. When the report deals with issues of great interest, debate can go on for several hours.

Cámara resolutions (*proposiciones con punto de acuerdo*) are a debate type that is tailor-made for members’ position-taking needs. If adopted, resolutions become the opinion of the chamber on some specific issue. But party leader support is a must: resolutions require urgent status (*urgente u obvia resolución*) in order to avoid committee referral and move directly to the floor. Only the Junta can request that the floor grants urgent status to at most two resolutions per session. If granted, the proposer takes the floor for five minutes. Parties then appoint one speaker each, for three minutes. The floor can then decide the previous question to vote the resolution, or open rounds of debate with self-appointed speakers.

Current events (*agenda política*) are party leaders’ position-taking venue. The Junta determines up to two themes for debate before consideration of reports and new bills, party leaders appointing one speaker each. The promoting party speaker gets first recognition for ten minutes, others five minutes each, and talk in reverse-size order. Current events debate cannot exceed two hours per session.

Members make motions, by catching the president’s eye from their seats, to interrupt the speaker. The president has discretion to deny, or grant up to three minutes to elaborate. Such motions are distinct from points of order (which members can also make, see Reglamento art. 114 for typified motions). They grant recognition to speak. *Cuestionamiento al orador* is to interrogate the speaker, who must also accept the question be made. *Alusiones personales* gives right of reply to alluded members by recognizing them immediately after the speaker ends. And *rectificación de hechos* wind up an additional name at the end of the list of speakers.

Rules like these are ill-designed to prevent plenary bottlenecks (Cox [2006](#B13)). Even in the presence of a majority party, individual members retain speaking rights that water down the Junta’s efforts to cartelize the legislative process. Absent formidable party discipline, preventing dilatory tactics would be enormously difficult. The final section elaborates.

Three former deputies from the larger parties offered quick impressions on internal party speech rules upon request.[[3]](#footnote-3) One commonality (in this very small sample) is the informal erosion of formal individual members’ debate rights in favor of centralized speech allocation. The PAN relies on a debate vice-leader (subcoordinador de debate parlamentario) responsible of selecting speakers in debates. When two members wish to speak at once, the vice-leader would let them figure who gets the party’s slot in the debate, who then speaks for or against. The PRI leadership sets apart issues of party interest, over which it decides all speakers centrally. Members communicate their wish to speak on unwhipped issues to their state caucus, who seeks authorization to speak with party whips. The left is no exception, leaders micromanaging the party’s debate strategy. An important consideration is that rules give parties one speaking slot each in many debates, regardless of size. Distributive conflict over speech is therefore more acute for larger parties, with longer speaker lists. A must for members whom the leadership leaves out is a solid understanding of the Rules. As pointed in the chapter’s epigraph, they can make individual speaking rights effective by introducing suspensive motions or amendments, both of which come equipped with recognition to take the floor.

Proksch and Slapin’s ([2015](#B35)) scheme, used across chapters in this volume, compares assemblies according to how members gain access to take the floor in order to deliver speeches (p. 79). Their continuum connects two extremes: party-controlled and individual member-controlled floor access. Formal rules place the Cámara towards the individual member-controlled access limit of the continuum; but partisan rules pull it towards the party-controlled access side. Party leaders move the strings of lawmaking. Their influence, however, derives almost exclusively from party discipline (near-perfect across the board) and not from agenda power (which is quite diffuse). The removal of single-term limits ought to make this tension between formal and de facto institutions harder to manage for all parties.

**The Determinants of Floor Access in Mexico**

Speeches were digitized by the stenographic service (scraped from [http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx](http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/)). I turned text into data with regular expressions—for HTML tag removal, for speaker and speech identification.[[4]](#footnote-4) The dependent variable is a member’s participation in plenary debate during each of the legislative periods observed. [[5]](#footnote-5) The 60th, 62nd, and 64th Legislatures had six, eight, and six periods, respectively, totaling twenty in the data. Four are extraordinary periods, the rest ordinary. Mean days per extraordinary period was 5.3, 31.4 for the ordinary. Debate models control for period type and length.

The units of observation are member periods. I use two specifications of the dependent variable. One is speechesi,p equal the number of days that member i took the floor in period p. Owing to the permissive agenda, speech made from the deputy’s seat by means of motions, without taking the lectern, count as debate. As elsewhere in the volume, days when a deputy spoke fewer than fifty words in total are arbitrarily considered non-debate and dropped, adding zero towards the member’s aggregates. Since officers do not participate in legislative debate, all steering speech, as when the president recognizes a deputy or the secretary calls a voice vote to dispense reading of the bill, was also removed. So was speech by non-deputies, as in cabinet member hearings. All text remaining is considered debate, members’ daily totals added across sessions in the same period to produce aggregates for analysis.

The other specification is wordsi,p equal the total words that member i spoke in period p divided by the proportion of all session days in period p that i served in the Cámara—members can take leaves of absence and many served less than the full period. So the denominators for members i and j who both spoke 2000 words, but i served uninterrupted throughout period p while j served only half of period p, are 1 and 0.5, respectively, and wordsi,p = 2000 while wordsj,p = 2000/0.5 = 4000.

Table [28.2](#Tab2) has a summary of the dependent variable along others of interest. Member-period observations total 9978. The median member spoke once per period, delivering 556 words relative to days in office (544 words per period in absolute terms). At 1300 words per period, means are substantially higher owing to a right-skewed speech distribution. Relevant to the choice of estimation methods, speech data are not evidently over-dispersed (at 3.1, the standard deviation is not that much higher than the mean of 2), so both negative binomial and poisson regression will be used for model fitting. And with nearly two out of five members (40.3 percent) uttering not a single word in the period, a zero-inflated approach is adopted too.

<COMP: INSERT TABLE 28.2 NEAR HERE>

Debate length is more intuitive when expressed as members’ daily totals instead of the period totals analyzed. In the median session, thirty-six different speakers contributed to daily debate, and six days had over one hundred speakers. Considering speakers only, the overall median daily speech length is 606 words. Mild term effects show up—the 60th period-by-period medians slightly above and the 64th slightly below the overall median—but period distributions are, in general, similar. The clearest exceptions are extraordinary periods. Models therefore also control for term and period type effects.

Deputy Valentina Batres holds the record for delivering the longest daily speech in the three terms examined. At 15,932 words, her March 11, 2008 speech is 50 percent longer than the runner-up and has about as many words as *Don Quijote de la Mancha*’s chapters 1 through 7 (forty-five pages in the edition I own). Batres and legislators close to AMLO used dilatory tactics throughout that day’s session, delaying the vote of a national geostatistics law. Filibustering was in fact aimed at something other than this technocratic bill: they wanted the Cámara president to amend the day’s order to hear about alleged misconduct by the minister of the interior. The names associated to outlier member-periods are few: only nine deputies repeatedly surpassed 20,000 words per period, mostly in the 62nd term. Routine filibusters in the Cámara are worthy of further study. The impact of gender in floor access is of interest across chapters. Of 1710 members observed, 39 percent are women. Owing to stricter quotas, 47 percent of the 64th Legislature were women, up from 28 in the 60th (Piscopo [2016](#B32)). Women’s participation in debate exceeds their numerical presence: despite subrepresentation among committee chairs and party leaders (but not Cámara presidents), 41 percent of both speeches and total words were delivered by women. A degree of concentration is also manifest, as women represented 37 percent of unique speechmakers, who took the floor more often and quite longer.

<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 28.1 NEAR HERE>

Figure 28.1 shows the percentage of debate by female members, pooled across the terms observed, and broken by main parties. Light gray bars are speeches by female deputies, mid gray bars the total words delivered by female deputies, and dark gray bars the percentage of women in the legislative party across terms observed. Relating speech and numerical importance shows that the average woman deputy from the left spoke 63 percent more words overall than their male counterparts. The reverse relation holds among PAN deputies but much less acute. The other parties break more or less even. In general, gender differences between parties are mild.

<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 28.2 NEAR HERE>

Single-term limits offer little leverage to evaluate seniority effects on floor access. Members wishing to return had to wait one term at least. It is remarkable that, despite this, 14 percent of members had previous federal deputy experience. A hint that the removal of single-terms will not be shunned by lack of static ambition, as often happens. Freshmen spoke 1122 words per period on average, compared to 2019 for members with past terms in Congress. Member periods with one past term made 44 percent more speeches and spoke 68 percent more words than those with none; with two past terms instead of one, 30 percent more speeches and 48 percent more words; but those with more than two past terms gave 33 percent less speeches and 53 percent fewer words than those with two. This drop could be attributable to earlier recruitment of senior members, antedating competitive politics; or it could be due to higher likelihood that senior members occupy positions that might depress willingness to speak despite floor access possibilities.

To analyze participation in floor debates, I fit multivariate regression models to words spoken. In the right side are status variables, member characteristics, and controls. Units are member periods.

*Status variables.* A dummy for majority status indicates members from Morena in the 64th Legislature—the only party controlling over 50 percent of seats. If debate is an (imperfect) substitute for legislative outcomes, then minority members demand more frequent floor participation (Proksch and Slapin [2015](#B35)). On the contrary, if members put value on debate per se, the majority may demand it as much as others, possibly with better access to the floor. Next, a dummy for committee chair status. When producing a report, the chair has privileged access to the floor, and this should translate into more speech. A dummy for party leader status completes this set. Leaders allocate party speakers. Whether or not they take advantage of this privilege remains an open question, a good leader ought to distribute the goodies, or risk removal.

*Member variables.* Aside from woman and seniority, regressors in this group include SMD, a dummy equal one for members elected in single-member districts. Systematic differences in members’ pork requests are attributable to the method of election (Kerevell [2015](#B23)), which may also translate into higher demand for access to the floor. I also interact this regressor with a dummy indicating the 64th Legislature, which dropped single-term limits (SMD x re-election). The more personal vote should generate higher demand for floor access. Party size is the percentage of seats the member’s party holds. Larger parties must divide the slot that all parties get to take the floor among more members, and this should show up as a negative regression coefficient. And a dummy suplente controls for substitute members. Regressors exclude members’ ages due to incomplete data, and party ideology, which made no difference in the estimates.

*Other controls.* Also in the right side are dummies for the 62nd and 64th terms (the 60th is the baseline) and another for extraordinary periods. Finally, with the option to take leaves of absence and have suplentes take over, some members served incomplete periods. The exposure is a member’s tenure, the number of days served in the period, logged. Higher exposure offers more opportunities for floor access. Unlike other chapters, models exclude party fixed effects, they made no substantive difference in the estimates reported.

Table [28.3](#Tab3) reports the estimation of six different model specifications. In the left side are both flavors of the dependent variable. Count models of speeches were fit with negative binomial regression (1 and 2) and zero-inflated poisson regression (3), while models of words relative to tenure with ordinary least squares (4, 5, and 6). Specifications vary the regressors. Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 include fixed-term effects to capture any heterogeneity between Legislatures that are pooled together. Model 6 also estimates separate error terms for each member, intended to capture individual heterogeneity. And model 3 accounts for the excess of zeroes in the distribution. The overall fit is correct across models, likelihood ratio tests (not reported) reject the intercept-only model with much confidence.

<COMP: INSERT TABLE 28.3 NEAR HERE>

Interesting patterns emerge from coefficient estimates. Party size exerted a negative and statistically significant effect in member floor access across specifications. This is easier to interpret from OLS coefficients: other variables constant, changing the party size from large (40 percent of seats) to small (15 percent) associates with a predicted drop of 1650 words per member in the period. Martin Luther King took sixteen minutes to deliver his famous “I have a dream” speech, which approximates that word count. I also find a positive, large, and statistically significant effect of majority status, which acts against size. Far from letting legislative accomplishments speak for themselves, majority members take the floor systematically more than those of similar-sized parties. Figure 28.3 demonstrates the discontinuity through simulation with model 2 parameters. As party size crosses the majority threshold the member gets a bonus, delivering a number of speeches comparable to a party with 25 to 30 percent of seats.

Other forms of status also associate positively to floor access, with results somewhat sensitive to model specification. Party leadership exerts a substantially larger effect than majority status on speech length, but much smaller on the number of speeches. Leaders get privileged floor access and appear to specialize in longer speeches, probably on more significant legislation. Committee chairs also deliver more speeches than other members, but controlling for term and member effects bears upon OLS coefficient significance, both substantially and statistically, hinting to important differences in speech length across committee jurisdictions and individuals.

<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 28.3 NEAR HERE>

I also find positive effects of seniority and gender that resonate with the bivariate patterns of floor access. The coefficient for women is not robust to random member effects (accounting for zero-inflation also bears on impact). This is probably due to the concentration of debate by women highlighted above, some deputies taking the floor disproportionately more than others. Overall, the effect of gender appears to be on par with that of one additional term of seniority in Figure 28.2, which reports average marginal effects.

A null finding of interest involves the method of election. The coefficient for SMD is indistinguishable from zero across models. Average marginal effects aid in negative binomial regression coefficient interpretation: in contrast to PR members and holding all other regressors at their mean, deputies elected in SMDs spoke slightly less, about 125 words in the period; the 95 percent confidence interval, however, barely excludes the zero and this signal therefore could be the product of chance alone. But look at the change in slope when interacted with re-election: this marginal effect is not just positive, but sufficient to cancel the negative pull of SMDs. Now a signal is discernible from random noise, even after controlling for majority status (the other big change in the 64th Legislature). Figure 28.3 makes this effect plain, a gap separates confidence intervals of predicted speeches by SMD members who can reelect (darker) and the term-limited (lighter). This finding hints to the invigoration of the personal vote after the removal of term limits and is worthy of more careful examination.

<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 28.4 NEAR HERE>

**Informal Waterproofing**

Where do the Cámara’s debate institutions sit relative to other stylized assemblies? Figure 28.4 does a simple comparative exercise by intersecting the permeability of floor access and the degree of informality in the constraints adopted.

<COMP: INSERT FIGURE 28.5 NEAR HERE>

Make the Cámara less permeable and more informal, get the UK House of Commons. As plenary time became a scarce commodity with suffrage extension and industrialization, British private members gradually abdicated their parliamentary rights, delegating all-encompassing legislative authority to the cabinet (Cox [1987](#B12)). But speaking time in the Commons remains formally reserved for individual MPs, who are recognized by a non-partisan Speaker (Blumenau and Damiani, this volume). Therefore, the efficient secret of British politics that turned backbenchers into legislative nonentities by the mid-1880s was and remains an informal arrangement, a superimposition of party hierarchy over formal procedure. Disruption of the party system inevitably reinstates formal member prerogatives, to some extent at least. To the cabinet ministers’ dismay, the Brexit section that split both parties since the 2016 referendum resurrected many of the Speaker’s agenda-setting powers that had been dormant for decades—if not centuries (*Economist* [2019](#B19)) (Figure 28.5).

Make less permeable but more formal, get the US House. The adoption of Reed’s rules in the 1880s achieved much the same centralization of agenda power as in Commons—allowing the Speaker to curb the minority’s power to delay and to select what bills to consider in what order (Cox and McCubbins [2005](#B15); Den Hartog 2004). Particular to debate, the crucial innovation empowered the Speaker to refuse to recognize members seeking to make dilatory motions, making floor access impermeable. Unlike Commons, however, the House has routinely written these constraints in the rules it adopts every two years at the start of each term.

Last, add permeability while keeping informality more or less constant, get the US Senate. Cloture to stop debate requires three-fifth of Senate floor support, against majority for the Cámara’s previous question (Gelman and Goplerud, this volume). After a committee reports out a bill, it is automatically included in the calendar, as in the Cámara. However, by precedent, the majority leader, in consultation with the minority leader, schedules what bill in the calendar shall be considered next (Campbell et al. [2002](#B5); Roberts and Smith [2007](#B38)). Absent this *informal* rule, the leader’s negative agenda power would be severely weakened and ineffective.

Why so many assemblies weaken members’ legislative rights through informal mechanisms, but retain those rights formally in place is an interesting puzzle. The central intuition in Riker’s work offers a clue: every majority is the sum of minorities. There is no guarantee that the tide will not turn in the near future, majorities losing elections or splitting to become minorities. Retaining members’ formal rights in place is an insurance policy to remain somewhat relevant when all else fails. Wawro and Schickler ([2006](#B43)) document routine threats to “go nuclear” and remove minority rights in today’s polarized Senate, yet the filibuster remains firmly in place.

**Conclusions**

Tension lies at the heart of legislative debate in the Cámara. On one hand, parties have informally, but effectively managed to reign in members’ capacity to take the floor. The effects that the chapter’s regression models uncovered for the majority, for leaders, and for committee chairs are all channeled through party structures in the Junta. On the other hand, formal rules grant individual members rights of recognition to take the floor and, we have seen, these take many guises. The effect attributable to SMDs after the removal of term limits is, in all likelihood, associated to renovated personal vote incentives that members face.

Whether or not the informal solution to avoid plenary bottlenecks continues to operate as it has so far in the Cámara is uncertain. Little intra-party competition used to remove personal vote incentives that leads members to differentiate by taking the floor in Proksch and Slapin’s model. With the removal of term limits, incumbents with static ambition may soon start overwhelming the system by exploiting the formal autonomy of floor debate in their need to strengthen their electoral connection.

It is important to keep in mind that the place of debate in the legislative process is *after* negative agenda filters. Agenda setting lets leaders prevent consideration of motions when they anticipate debate to go in undesired directions—speakers opening issues that threaten to divide the majority. When and if parties can no longer prevent delays as they have, pressure to reform the rules will inevitably build up. Reform could give leaders strong *ex ante* vetoes to prevent moving unwanted bills to the floor, precluding debate; by removing the formal rights that render floor access so permeable; or both.

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**Table 28.1** Parliamentary debate types in Mexico

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Debate type (in Spanish)** | **Goal** | **Duration (mins)** | **Selector** | **Veto** |
| 1. Introduce legislation (iniciativa) | Author presents the bill |  |  |  |
| * A new law |  | 10 | member | no |
| * Amend a law |  | 5 | member | no |
| 2. Committee report (dictamen) | Move for floor consideration |  |  |  |
| * Debate en lo general vs SQ, chair |  | 10 | comm.maj | pres.\* |
| -“ “ “, Others |  | 5 | member | floor |
| * Negative report |  | 3 | comm.maj | pres.\* |
| 3. Recognition-granting motions | Contend with speakers or project |  |  |  |
| * Amendment (reserva), introducer |  | 5 | member | no |
| * “ “, Others |  | 5 | member | floor |
| * Question to speaker (cuestionamiento) |  | 3 | member | speaker |
| * Right of reply (alusiones personales) |  | pres.\*\* | member | no |
| * Fact correction (rectificación) |  | pres.\*\* | member | no |
| 4. Resolutions (puntos de acuerdo) | Position taking |  |  |  |
| * Standard, author |  | 10 | member | comm.maj |
| * Urgent, author (obvia resolución) |  | 5 | Junta | floor |
| * Other speakers |  | 3 | party | no |
| 5. Current events (agenda política) | Position taking | < 2hrs |  |  |
| * Junta proponent |  | 10 | Junta | no |
| * Other speakers |  | 5 | member | no |

\* President can delay/prevent speech by granting recommit. \*\* President sets time limit.

**Table 28.2** Descriptive statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **min** | **median** | **mean** | **sd** | **max** | **N** |
| N speeches (DV1) | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3.1 | 37 | 9978 |
| N words/exposure (DV2) | 0 | 556 | 1326 | 2665.7 | 50,291 | 9978 |
| N words | 0 | 544 | 1301 | 2632.2 | 50,291 | 9978 |
| Days in office (exposure) | 1 | 29 | 25.4 | 12.2 | 40 | 9978 |
| Party share | 0.4 | 25 | 29.3 | 16.2 | 51 | 9978 |
| Years since frosh | 0 | 1 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 17 | 9978 |
| Previous terms (seniority) | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 4 | 9978 |
| Age | 21 | 46 | 45.9 | 10.1 | 78 | 7453 |
|  | 0 | 1 | tot | N |  |  |
| Spoke | 40.3 | 59.7 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Majority | 84.7 | 15.3 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Leader | 98.4 | 1.6 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Chair | 88.4 | 11.6 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| SMD | 39.3 | 60.7 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| PAN | 73.4 | 26.6 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| PRI | 73.7 | 26.3 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Left | 68.9 | 31.1 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Suplente | 94.1 | 5.9 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Extraord | 80.4 | 19.6 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| Female | 63.7 | 36.3 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| 60th | 69.8 | 30.2 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| 62nd | 59.7 | 40.3 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |
| 64th | 70.6 | 29.4 | 100 | 9978 |  |  |

**Table 28.3** Determinants of floor access and words uttered in legislative debates in Mexico

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **DV = Speeches in period** | | | **DV = Words/exposure in period** | | |
|  | **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** | **(6)** |
| Exposure (logged) | 0.99\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 1.07\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |  |  |
| Majority | 1.20\*\*\* | 0.98\*\*\* | 1.11\*\*\* | 826.87\*\*\* | 1738.55\*\*\* | 1102.46\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (84.75) | (128.10) | (219.25) |
| Party leader | 0.35\*\*\* | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.22\*\*\* | 2241.56\*\*\* | 1911.89\*\*\* | 1260.70\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (202.81) | (199.88) | (302.50) |
| Comm. chair | 0.28\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 289.72\*\*\* | 225.24\*\*\* | 184.63 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (78.23) | (76.64) | (127.37) |
| Previous terms | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* | 210.68\*\*\* | 245.54\*\*\* | 253.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (46.37) | (45.33) | (83.10) |
| Women | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.04\*\* | 136.54\*\*\* | 125.68\*\* | 16.18 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (52.64) | (52.14) | (96.83) |
| Party size | -0.05\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -0.04\*\*\* | -61.52\*\*\* | -71.85\*\*\* | -63.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (1.92) | (2.20) | (3.76) |
| SMD | 0.03 | -0.06\* | -0.01 | -48.69 | -90.05 | -113.31 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (53.48) | (63.34) | (112.33) |
| SMD x re-elect |  | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.10\*\*\* |  | 232.39\*\* | -8.32 |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.03) |  | (111.13) | (182.94) |
| Suplente | -0.17\*\*\* | -0.09 | -0.23\*\*\* | -271.52\*\* | -346.94\*\*\* | -330.99\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (106.35) | (103.79) | (137.19) |
| 62nd Leg. |  | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.24\*\*\* |  | 726.90\*\*\* | 843.14\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.03) | (0.02) |  | (60.94) | (94.39) |
| 64th Leg. |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* |  | -279.10\*\*\* | 316.26\*\* |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.03) |  | (107.10) | (158.53) |
| Extraordinary |  | 0.67\*\*\* | 0.69\*\*\* |  | -1234.16\*\*\* | -1240.27\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.08) | (0.07) |  | (64.62) | (43.42) |
| Constant | -1.66\*\*\* | -2.97\*\*\* | -1.95\*\*\* | 2874.07\*\*\* | 3064.88\*\*\* | 2805.63\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (68.55) | (84.01) | (140.25) |
| Fixed effects | no | term | term | no | term | term |
| Random effects | no | no | no | no | no | member |
| Estimation method | negative binomial | Negative binomial | Zero-inflated Poisson | OLS | OLS | Linear mixed-effects |
| Overdispersion | 1.55\*\*\* (0.05) | 1.65\*\*\* (0.05) |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 9978 | 9978 | 9978 | 9978 | 9978 | 9978 |
| R2 |  |  |  | 0.14 | 0.18 |  |
| AIC | 32689.90 | 32478.98 | 34832.82 |  |  | 178880.70 |

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

1. Reliance in primaries for SMD candidate selection, mostly by the PAN (Ascencio and Kerevel [2021](#B1)), on occasions by the PRI (Poiré [2002](#B33)), opens room for exceptions to centralized ballot access. They deserve closer attention. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This could explain considerable amounts of constituency service in systems with party-centered campaigns, such as the UK in the 1970s (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina [1987](#B4)). The personal vote adds a couple percentage points to incumbents in the general election, insufficient to cancel out party tides, but enough to decide swing constituencies. A party can veto the MP’s renomination, but risks not holding those seats. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Email exchanges with former deputies identified in footnote 1, June 17, 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Analysis was performed in R (R Dev. Core Team 2011). I relied on libraries lme4, lubridate, margins, MASS, plyr, stargazer, and zoo. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Common terms have ambiguous meanings in different assemblies. I use Mexican terminology here. A Legislature is a term, the Cámara between two congressional elections. Roman numerals distinguish consecutive Legislatures since the second half of the nineteenth century. This chapter covers the LX, LXII, and LXIV. Legislative years break into two ordinary legislative periods, one covering September through December, another February through April. Extraordinary legislative periods may be convened during the recess in order to consider specific legislation. Analysis aggregates each member’s speeches in a given period (merging together all extraordinary periods that year, if any). So members in a legislative year like 2012–2013 (that had no extraordinary periods) have two word aggregates in the dataset, one for each ordinary period; in a year like 2013–2014 (that did), they have three word aggregates in the data. Member-periods are the units of observation in the analysis. And a plenary session is a specific day when diputados met. During ordinary periods, sessions are usually held on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and may be scheduled in other weekdays if the Junta so decides. For instance, diputados met on forty and thirty-one days in the first and second ordinary periods of 2013–2014, respectively, and nine days in extraordinary periods, for a yearly total of eighty session days. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)